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DISCOURAGING THE DUAL PRACTICE OF
ACCOUNTING AND LAW: IS THIS A VALID EXERCISE
OF THE STATE'S POWER TO REGULATE THE LEGAL
AND ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONS?
James E. McClain, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for the services of both accountants and lawyers is
well established in virtually all sectors of our economy. Tradition-
ally, one who seeks such services will contact practitioners who de-
vote most of their working hours to either accounting or law. The
number of individuals trained and licensed in both professions,
however, is increasing. The possibility of a person simultaneously
representing himself to the public as an accountant and a lawyer
has caused concern within each profession. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to examine the state of the law regarding the dual practice of
accounting and law and to evaluate the arguments both for and
against allowing the dual practitioner to convey the nature of his
practice to the public.
Basic to this analysis are the definitions of accounting, accoun-
tant, law, and lawyer. Accounting is defined as "[t]he art of record-
ing, classifying, reporting, and interpreting the financial data of an
organization."' According to the National Conference of Lawyers
and Certified Public Accountants, a certified public accountant
(CPA) is "a person trained and expert in accounting who has passed
a uniform examination and, by this demonstration of competency
and by meeting other requirements, has been certified as such by a
state board."' Unless otherwise specified, the term "accounting"
refers to activities of a CPA as opposed to the accounting services
offered by noncertified public accountants. Law is defined as
"[tihat which must be obeyed and followed by citizens, subject to
sanctions or legal consequences . . . "I while a lawyer is defined as
''a person expert in law who has passed the bar examination and,
* Associate with the law firm of Spitzberg, Mitchell & Hays in Little Rock, Arkansas;
B.B.A., University of Arkansas at Monticello, 1973; M.B.A., University of Arkansas at Fay-
etteville, 1974; J. D., Southern Methodist University, 1977; CPA, Licensed by the Arkansas
State Board of Accountancy, 1975.
1. W. PYLE, J. WHITE & K. LARSON, FUNDAMENTAL ACCOUNTING PRINCIPALS 19 (8th ed.
1978).
2. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, A STUDY OF
INTERPROFESSIONAL RELATIONS 6 (1970).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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by this demonstration of competency and by meeting other require-
ments, has been admitted to the bar."
4
This article is divided into three major topics. First, an exami-
nation is made of the accounting profession's Code of Professional
Ethics and the legal profession's Code of Professional Responsibility
to determine the restrictions which are placed upon one who wishes
to practice simultaneously in both professions. Second, the provi-
sions of the United States Constitution which grant or restrict the
power of the states to regulate the two professions are analyzed. For
the purpose of this analysis, a hypothetical situation is posed and
the various constitutional considerations are discussed in the con-
text of this hypothetical. Last, competing policy considerations
which have been espoused by different commentators are reviewed
and evaluated.
II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Accounting Profession
The accounting profession, through the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), has attempted to discourage
the dual practice of accounting and law in several ways. If one
scanned the Rules of Conduct of the AICPA Code of Professional
Ethics looking for limitations in this area, the caption that would
most likely catch one's eye is "Rule 504-Incompatible occupa-
tions." Rule 504 states, "A member who is engaged in the practice
of public accounting shall not concurrently engage in any business
or occupation which impairs his objectivity in rendering profes-
sional services or serves as a feeder to his practice."5 This language
is not specific; therefore, it is subject to official interpretations. The
AICPA's interpretation of Rule 504,6 however, merely restates the
rule and reiterates parts of other rules relating to acts discreditable
to the profession,' to solicitation, and to confidentiality of client
information? Furthermore, none of the current 173 ethics rulings
address the issue of the dual practice of accounting and law in terms
of their being "incompatible occupations."
4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 2,
at 9.
5. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
[hereinafter cited as AICPA Code] Rule 504 (1973).
6. Id. Interpretation 504-1.
7. Id. Rule 501.
8. Id. Rule 502.
9. Id. Rule 301.
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This lack of guidance for the dual practitioner is not a result of
the AICPA's 1973 revision of its Code of Professional Ethics. The
predecessor to Rule 504 was Rule 4.04.10 There were at least 16
informal opinions issued by the AICPA's Committee on Professional
Ethics specifically concerning Rule 4.04 and incompatible occupa-
tions. None of these opinions addressed the accountant and attorney
in dual practice."
The limitations which have been placed on the dual practi-
tioner by the accounting profession have come indirectly through its
antisolicitation provisions. 2 One of the questions presented was
whether a CPA who is also a lawyer may list himself in the certified
public accountant section of the yellow pages as a "tax attorney."'
3
It was determined that the designation "tax attorney" would be a
violation of Interpretation 502-3" because it associates a CPA's
name with a designation indicating the special skills he possesses
or the particular services which he is prepared to render.' This
ruling does not answer the dual practice question since it actually
was directed to the issue of the designation of a specialty.
One of the AICPA's most severe limitations on the dual practi-
tioner was also in the context of the antisolicitation rule as it applied
to a firm's stationery.' 6 At issue in the ethical ruling was whether a
CPA who was also admitted to the bar could represent himself on
his letterhead as both an attorney and a CPA.'I It was affirmatively
stated that the Code does not prohibit the simultaneous practice of
accounting and law by one licensed in both professions; however, it
was determined that separate letterheads should be used. Thus,
while not prohibiting dual practice, the AICPA has effectively lim-
ited the dual practitioner's ability to communicate the nature of his
practice to the public.
10. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, Rule 4.04 (1965).
11. J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 249
(1965).
12. AICPA Code, supra note 5, Rule 502.
13. A.I.C.P.A. PROF. STAND. (CCH) 591.115, Ethical Rulings on Other Responsibilities
and Practices, No. 48 (March 1, 1973).
14. AICPA Code, supra note 5, Interpretation 502-3.
15. A.I.C.P.A. PROF. STAND. (CCH) 591.116, Ethical Rulings on Other Responsibilities
and Practices, No. 58 (March 1, 1973).
16. AICPA Code, supra note 5, Interpretation 502-4.
17. A.I.C.P.A. PROF. STAND. (CCH) 591.155, Ethical Rulings on Other Responsibilities
and Practices, No. 78 (March 1, 1973).
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B. The Legal Profession
The dual practice of accounting and law has also been viewed
with disfavor by the legal profession. There was no canon in the
former American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics
which expressly prohibited an attorney from simultaneously prac-
ticing in another profession or engaging in any given occupation or
business. As early as 1932 in Opinion 57,18 however, the Committee
on Professional Ethics of the ABA expressed doubts concerning a
lawyer's engaging in certain other callings. The Committee stated
that it was improper for a lawyer to engage in business activities
when they were of such a nature or were so conducted as to be
inconsistent with his duty as a member of the Bar." It was further
held to be improper for a lawyer to engage in any business which
furnished its patrons with services which would be professional serv-
ices if rendered by a lawyer.
In the only part of Opinion 57 which was actually specific, the
Committee stated that it was improper for a lawyer to devote a
portion of his time to the management of an insurance adjuster's
bureau. It reasoned that the investigation and adjustment of insur-
ance claims frequently led to litigation, and that the solicitation of
business by a bureau handling the adjustments was, as a practical
matter, a means of procuring professional employment for any law-
yer in general practice who might be interested in or connected with
it.
There have been several opinions handed down since Opinion
57 on the subject of dual occupations. These are enumerated in
Opinion 328.20 It should be noted that each of these prior opinions
by the Committee on Professional Ethics was rendered before the
adoption of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility or the 1978
amendments to them. Opinion 328 was the first ruling on the matter
of dual occupations by the Committee after the adoption of the 1969
Code.
In Opinion 32821 the Committee noted that the terms "indirect
solicitation" and "feeding a law practice" had been omitted from
the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee inter-
preted this omission as an intention on the part of the Code's drafts-
men to refuse to rely on those vague phrases as standards by which
to judge the outside activities and occupations of lawyers. It was
18. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 57 (1932).
19. Id.
20. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 328 (1972).
21. Id.
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stated that "this Committee cannot condemn any activity today on
the basis of 'indirect solicitation' or 'feeding' of a law practice. Any
proscription must be based upon the provision of the code.'"2 Using
this method of analysis, the Committee based Opinion 328, which
was issued in August 1972, on the unamended Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 2-102(E).3
The Committee determined that a lawyer may simultaneously
hold himself out as an accountant and an attorney as long as the
attorney does not violate DR 2-102(E). DR 2-102(E) provided the
following: "A lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and
22. Id.
23. The pertinent part of DR 2-102 was amended to read as follows:
Professional Notices, Letterheads, and Offices:
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or participate in the use of professional
cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, or similar profes-
sional notices or devices, except that the following may be used:
(1) A professional card of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a
lawyer, and giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his law
firm, and any information permitted under DR 2-105. A professional card
of a law firm may also give the names of members and associates. Such
cards may be used for identification.
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed as-
sociations or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters pertain-
ing to the professional offices of a lawyer or law firm, which may be
mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives.
It shall not state biographical data except to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to identify the lawyer or to explain the change in his association, but
it may state the immediate past position of the lawyer. It may give the
names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession.
It shall not state the nature of the practice except as permitted under DR
2-105.
(3) A sign on or near the door of the office and in the building directory
identifying the law office. The sign shall not state the nature of the
practice, except as permitted under DR 2-105.
(4) A letterhead of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a lawyer,
and giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his law firm,
associates and any information permitted under DR 2-105 ....
In re: Amends. to the Code of Prof. Resp. and Canons of Jud'l Ethics, 263 Ark. 948, 957-58
(1978) (per curiam). DR 2-105 was also amended as follows:
Limitation of Practice:
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist or as limiting his
practice, except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office may use the designation "Patents," "Patent Attor-
ney," "Patent Lawyer," or "Registered Patent Attorney" or any combi-
nation of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law
or law practice by the Supreme Court of Arkansas or its designee may
hold himself out as such, but only in accordance with the rules prescribed
by that authority.
Id. at 964-65.
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another profession or business shall not so indicate on his letter-
head, office sign, or professional card, nor shall he identify himself
as a lawyer in any publication in connection with his other profes-
sion or business."'" Thus, an attorney/CPA is allowed to practice
both professions from the same office, but he cannot indicate this
on his letterhead, office sign, or professional card. " It would be
reasonable for one to suggest that the ostensible acceptance of the
dual practitioner by the ABA is of dubious value when the practi-
tioner's ability to communicate the nature of his practice is severely
curtailed.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. The State's Power of Regulation
The practice of law is so intimately connected with the exercise
of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to
define and regulate the legal profession naturally and logically be-
longs to the judicial department of the state government." While
the final authority for regulation of the legal profession usually rests
with a state supreme court, most states have legislatively estab-
24. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-102(E) (as amended Aug. 1976).
The language used in the amended version of DR 2-102 does not change the effect of the prior
rule with respect to the dual practice of law and accounting. The dual practitioner is pre-
cluded by DR 2-102 and DR 2-105 from specifying the nature of his dual practice on his
letterhead and office door or in a professional notice. See the quoted Code in note 23 supra.
But see DR 2-101(B)(12) which allows an attorney to publish or broadcast his "[t]echnical
and professional licenses." In re: Amends. to the Code of Prof. Resp. and Canons of Jud'l
Ethics, 263 Ark. 948, 954 (1978) (per curiam).
25. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 328 (1972). Not all of
the state bar associations have accepted Opinion 328 and its strict reliance on the language
in the Code. For example, the Florida Bar Committee on Professional Ethics, while accepting
much of Opinion 328, unanimously held that a person who simultaneously practices law and
accounting must keep the two practices physically and functionally separate. The Florida
committee mentioned but did not discuss the standard argument that the second profession
being practiced from the same office leads directly or indirectly to the solicitation of business
and the feeding of a law practice. With reference to this argument, the committee stated, "We
shall not discuss the validity of this premise but would point out in an era when the profession
of law is being challenged on all fronts, we should not recede from an ethical principle which
has held the legal professional separate, apart and above others." Thus, the Florida Bar did
not base its determination that dual practice is undesirable on the theory of solicitation, but
rather indicated that it would be degrading to the legal profession for it to mix itself with
other professions. FLORIDA BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ADVISORY
OPINION 73-18 (1973) reprinted in 38 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 86 (1974). But see the North
Carolina Bar Newsletter, Jan. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 1, in which a proposed amendment to DR
2-102(E) of the NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY reads as follows: "A
lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession, may so indicate on
his letterhead, office sign and professional card."
26. 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 2 (1963).
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lished state examining boards to aid in the administrative task of
licensing attorneys in that particular state.27
The states have a compelling interest in the practice of profes-
sions within their boundaries, and, as part of their power to protect
the public health, safety, and other valid interests, they have broad
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulat-
ing the practice of professions.28 There are limitations, however, in
the states' regulatory powers over these professions.
2
1
Section III B poses a hypothetical situation in which the consti-
tutional issues that affect a dual practitioner of law and accounting
are discussed. The fact situation which follows involves neither the
problem presented by the division of fees with a non-lawyer :", nor the
problems attendant to the unauthorized practice of law." The nar-
row issue considered is the right of a practicing attorney/CPA to
convey the nature of his practice to the public.
B. Hypothetical Situation
The main character in this hypothetical situation is Accoun-
tant/Lawyer Albert Smith, who will be called Al for short. Al has
passed the CPA exam, has met the experience requirements of the
State of Arkansas, and has received his certificate as a Certified
Public Accountant in Arkansas. Likewise, Al has passed the Bar
examination in Arkansas and has been admitted to the Arkansas
Bar.
Al establishes an office from which he intends to offer legal as
well as accounting services. In order to make his office identifiable,
27. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-104 (1962). The statute states that the Supreme
Court may appoint a board of examiners, of practitioners in the Supreme Court for each
judicial circuit to conduct examination for license, according to a standard adopted by the
Supreme Court.
28. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Many of the challenges
to a state's power to license attorneys relate to the setting of qualifications for admission to
the various state bar associations. It has been stated that the ultimate purpose of all regula-
tion of the admission of attorneys is to assure the courts of the assistance of advocates of
ability, learning, and sound character and to protect the public from incompetent and dishon-
est practitioners. See, e.g., Henington v. State Bd. of Examiners, 60 N.M. 393, 291 P.2d 1108
(1956), in which the court held that a bar examing committee did not exceed its powers or
act unreasonably in establishing as one of the requirements for admission to the bar the
graduation from a law school approved by the American Bar Association. The court also
found the establishment of reasonable education qualifications for admission to the bar does
not violate the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution in regard to either
the due process clause or the equal protection clause.
30. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 3-102(A) (as amended Aug. 1976).
31. Id., DR 3-101.
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Al also obtains business cards and office stationery with similar
designations and which include his address and phone number.
Some time after the initiation of his practice, the Grievance
Committee of the State Bar Association notifies Al that a complaint
has been filed alleging that he has violated DR 2-102(A)(3).:1 Al also
receives a notification from the State Board of Accountancy that it
was reported to them that he is conducting his practice contrary to
Ethical Ruling on Other Responsibilities and Practices Number
78 .11 Being convinced of the justness of his cause, Al refuses to
comply with the ethical rules; therefore, the Grievance Committee
of the State Bar Association revokes his license to practice law and
the State Board of Accountancy withdraws his certification. Al is
unsuccessful in his attempts to persuade the Arkansas courts that
the sanctions imposed upon him are unjust. He now finds himself
before the United States Supreme Court in an attempt to save his
means of a livelihood.
C. Freedom of Expression
1. The First and Fourteenth Amendments.-The first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution states that, "Congress shall
make no laws . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . . " Based
on a literal interpretation of the first amendment, one might believe
that it is addressed solely to restrictive acts passed by Congress.
In 1907 Patterson v. Colorado"4 presented the United States
Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether the first
amendment prohibition against abridging freedom of speech was
made applicable to action by the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Although the Court refused to incorporate the first
amendment into the fourteenth, Mr. Justice Holmes recognized
some limitations on the right of freedom of expression, distinguish-
ing between previous restraints upon publications and subsequent
punishment of publications which could be deemed contrary to pub-
lic welfare. 5
32. See note 23 supra.
33. Ethical Rulings No. 78, supra note 17.
34. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
35. Id. at 462.
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The Court deviated from its holding in Patterson in Gitlow v.
New York. 3 1 The first amendment guarantee of free speech was held
to be among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from im-
pairment by a state. The statement in Gitlow concerning the incor-
poration of the first amendment by the fourteenth was very suc-
cinct. Mr. Justice Sanford, writing for the Court, said,
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amend-
ment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.'
The Court therefore applied first amendment guarantees to prohibit
certain legislation by the state and made a tremendous constitu-
tional leap. This decision applies directly to the case of Al Smith.
It can be concluded that Al's freedom of speech and expression are
protected from state abridgement by the incorporation of the first
amendment into the fourteenth.
Another constitutional development occurred in the 1938 case
of Lovell v. City of Griffin.3 The United States Supreme Court
extended the first amendment guarantees to proscribe certain rules
and regulations promulgated by instrumentalities of the state." The
36. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The case involved a provision of the New York Penal Law that
defined criminal anarchy as a doctrine advocating the overthrow of organized government by
force, violence, or by assassination of executive heads or officers or by other unlawful means.
The statute further declared that any person who by word of mouth or writing advocated,
advised, or taught criminal anarchy, or who printed, published, edited, issued, or knowingly
circulated, sold, distributed, or publicly displayed any book, paper, document, or written or
printed matter advocating that organized government should be overthrown by force, viol-
ence, or unlawful means, was guilty of a felony. The defendant was a member of the Left
Wing Section of the Socialist Party. He subscribed to and promoted through certain publica-
tions some of their objectives including the overthrow of the United States government
through a Communist revolution. In the Gitlow decision the Court cast aside a statement in
the earlier case of Prudential Ins. Co. of American v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922), that the
fourteenth amendment imposes no restrictions on the states concerning freedom of speech.
37. Id. at 666.
38. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
39. In Lovell the instrumentality was the municipality of Griffin, Georgia. The appel-
lant had been convicted of the violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind without a permit. The appellant
admitted to engaging in the acts for which she was convicted, but she contended that since
the ordinance absolutely prohibited the distribution of literature of any kind within the City
of Griffin without the permission of the City Manager, the ordinance abridged freedom of the
press and restricted her personally in the free exercise of her religion. The Court restated the
Gitlow holding that freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the
first amendment from abridgment by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights
and liberties which are protected by the fourteenth amendment from invasion by the states.
1979]
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Court held that municipal ordinances adopted under state authority
constitute state action and are within the prohibition of the amend-
ment.4 0
In view of Gitlow and Lovell, Al believes that the revocation of
his license to practice law and accounting by the respective state
boards provides the "state action" required to invoke the protection
of the fourteenth amendment. Finding sufficient state action, Al
may argue that Arkansas is infringing on his first amendment
rights. The Court has recognized state action in similar situations.'
2. The Dual Practitioner's Right to Freedom of Expression
Balanced Against a State Interest.-Although the words of the first
amendment appear unequivocal, it is clear that from the earliest
days of our Constitution the words were not absolutes and that there
were limitations on the appropriate time and place for certain ex-
pressions. Prior to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 2 attorneys were not
allowed to advertise or otherwise solicit legal business without strict
compliance with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility."'
Unfortunately Bates did not answer the question of whether an
attorney/CPA may indicate his dual practice on his door, letter-
head, or calling card. With-respect to first amendment interpreta-
tion, the question is an important one. An examination of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions balancing state and indi-
vidual interests provides a background for answering this question.
Because the regulation of the practice of law is generally held
to be a matter of state concern, the United States Supreme Court
has had few occasions to address the subject. The Court, however,
did confront the issue of the power of a state to regulate the practice
of law in Cohen v. Hurley." In Cohen an attorney was accused of
"ambulance chasing." The Court stated, "It is certainly not beyond
the realm of permissible state concerns to conclude that too much
40. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). Although Lovell is the case most
often cited for the proposition that municipal ordinances constitute action by the state, see
also Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. City of Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916); Home Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207
U.S. 20 (1907).
41. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
42. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43. See also DR 2-101(B)(12) quoted in note 24 supra.
44. 366 U.S. 117 (1961). As a practical matter the Court probably would not have
granted certiorari but for the posing of the constitutional issue of whether an attorney's
refusal to answer questions during a disciplinary proceeding as to the propriety of his profes-
sional conduct could be a per se ground for disbarment. This case was overruled on the issue
of the right of an attorney to refuse to answer questions during a disciplinary proceeding.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
[Vol. 2:47
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attention to the business of getting clients may be incompatible
with a sufficient devotion to duties which a lawyer owes to the court
... )45 The Court, therefore, examined the conduct which the
state sought to regulate and determined that there was a
"permissible state concern" to justify the regulation.
The crucial point in the analysis of Al's problem is to determine
whether there would be a "permissible state concern" that would be
contrary to Al simultaneously representing himself as an attorney
and as a certified public accountant on his office door or letterhead.
No conclusions are reached at this point, but it is questionable
whether the state in the exercise of its regulatory power over the
legal profession has a permissible concern that outweighs Al's first
amendment right to communicate the nature of his practice to oth-
ers.
In 1963 the United States Supreme Court considered facts that
differ somewhat from those currently being examined but which call
forth some of the same legal principles. In NAACP v. Button16 the
Court held that a statute which made it a misdemeanor for a person
or organization to solicit legal business for itself or for any attorney
was invalid. The Court stated that the NAACP had shown that its
activities fell within the first amendment protections and the State
failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, such as the
existence of evils which resulted from the activities of the NAACP.
Therefore, there was no justification for the broad prohibitions
which the State had imposed. Applying this reasoning to the case
of our friend Al, it appears that the Court should determine whether
the state's regulation of the legal profession is sufficiently narrow
and whether Al's first amendment expressions are being suppressed
without substantial justification.
Another line of inquiry pertinent to Al's case concerns the de-
gree of interest which a state must have to regulate an activity. It
is important to leave the states free to select their own bars, but it
is equally important that the states neither exercise this power in
an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor infringe on the freedom
of political expression or association.47 A bar composed of lawyers
of good character is a worthy objective, but it is unnecessary to
sacrifice vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal.4" The decisions
45. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961).
46. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The NAACP's program included advising
blacks of their right to integrated facilities, encouraging individuals to commence desegrega-
tion litigation, and offering legal and financial assistance for such suits.
47. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
48. Id. at 273.
1979]
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of the United States Supreme Court have consistently held that
only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject can
justify limiting first amendment freedom. 9 A compelling state in-
terest was not found in NAACP v. Button. 10 It appears that a com-
pelling state interest does not exist for denying Al the right to simul-
taneously hold himself out as an attorney and as a CPA. The com-
peting considerations which should be examined in determining
whether a compelling state interest exists are discussed in section
IV of this article.
3. The First Amendment Rights of the Recipients of Free Ex-
pressions. -Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State
Bar' illustrates the point that the first amendment right of free
speech is co-extensive with the right of a person to receive that
expression. The Virginia State Bar brought suit against the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen seeking an injunction to prevent the
Brotherhood from carrying on activities which, the Bar charged,
constituted the solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized
practice of law in Virginia. The charge was based on the Brother-
hood's provision of a Department of Legal Counsel for the member
railroad workers. The Court held that labeling the acts of the Broth-
erhood as solicitation was insufficient to foreclose the constitutional
right of the individual workers to obtain legal information.
The Court recognized the broad power of the state to regulate
the practice of law within its borders. It pointed out, however, that
Virginia was not seeking to halt a commercialization of the legal
profession which might threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the
administration of justice. Furthermore, the State failed to show any
49. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
50. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964), in which attorneys had been recommended by a union to provide legal
services for its individual members. It was alleged that such activities amounted to solicita-
tion of legal business. The Court held that a state could not, by involving the power to
regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way on the right of individuals
and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic
public interest. This case is discussed in greater detail in section I C3 infra.
51. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). The activities performed by the Brotherhood included assisting
the prosecution of claims by injured railroad workers or by the families of workers killed on
the job. This assistance was rendered by maintaining a Department of Legal Counsel. It is
this result which the Virginia State Bar contended amounted to solicitation of legal business.
The Court noted that laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when
dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries. Thus, since the railroads certainly
had access to able counsel, the workers should be entitled to unite to help one another
preserve and enforce rights which had been granted them under various federal laws. The only
practical way for the workers to obtain the legal assistance they needed was for their Depart-
ment of Legal Counsel to advise them of competent and honest lawyers which were available.
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appreciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from rec-
ommending selected attorneys to represent injured workers. Thus,
the first amendment right of the individual trainmen to receive the
proffered information prevailed.
The issue of the rights of recipients of free expressions was also
presented in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.5 The constitutional
question was whether the State could prevent the publication in a
newspaper of lawyers' truthful advertisement concerning the availa-
bility and terms of routine legal services. Appellants, who were li-
censed attorneys, were charged with violating the Arizona Supreme
Court's disciplinary rule which prohibited attorneys from advertis-
ing in newspapers or other media. The Court held that the flow of
such information could not be restrained and the application of the
disciplinary rule against the appellants was violative of the first
amendment. In discussing the problem of misleading advertising,
the Court refused to see merit in a justification that was based on
the benefits of public ignorance, calling for a remedy of more disclo-
sure rather than less if an advertisement presented an inaccurate
picture.53 The Court gave a detailed summary of its 1976 opinion in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,54 stating that the conclusion that Arizona's discipli-
nary rule was violative of the first amendment could be said to flow
a fortiori from this decision. 5 Like the prohibition against advertis-
ing of prescription drugs in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Court found that the disciplinary rule in Bates served to inhibit the
free flow of commercial speech and to keep the public in ignorance. "
Returning to the situation of hypothetical Al, one should con-
sider the competing interests to determine whether a client or po-
tential client has a first amendment right to be informed of the
nature of Al's professional practice. It seems fair to assert that some
potential clients would not want to avail themselves of the services
52. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) which dealt with the right of a licensed pharma-
cist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. At issue was a state statute which declared
it to be unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise prescription drug prices.
Members of a consumer group were held to have a First Amendment right in the ability of a
licensed pharmacist to transmit price information to the consumers. The majority of the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Blackmun, stated, "If there is a right to advertise, there
is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees."
Id. at 757. See also note 24 supra.
53. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).




of one engaged in the dual practice of accounting and law. For
example, a potential client with a criminal problem might infer that
a dual practitioner might not have the experience and expertise to
handle his problem. In this and other analogous situations, it seems
that a dual practitioner should not only be allowed to properly rep-
resent the nature of his practice, but also be required to do so. It
appears equally fair to submit that there are persons, such as small
businessmen, who might like to obtain the services of a dual practi-
tioner but would be unable to locate one because of the restrictions
placed on the manner in which such a practitioner may convey his
message to the public.
IV. COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Competence in Both Fields
One of the first arguments that surfaces in any discussion of
dual practice is the contention that it is difficult for anyone to
maintain a high level of competence in both fields57 The apparent
validity of this argument gives it immediate appeal. Few practition-
ers who work exclusively as a lawyer or as an accountant, however,
are able to maintain a high level of competency in all fields of law
or in all areas of accounting, respectively. Most practitioners, there-
fore, concentrate on one or possibly several areas within the broad
disciplines of law or accounting. The choice may be made for the
practitioner by his firm, or it may be a result of his own interests.
Furthermore, the needs of one's clients may lead a practitioner to
forego undertakings in certain spheres to devote attention to areas
in which he is often called upon to render service. Thus, even though
part of an attorney/CPA's practice may be termed law and part of
it accounting, the actual scope of his practice may be no broader
than one who confines his practice solely to law or accounting.
Implicit in the argument that a dual practitioner cannot main-
tain competency in both fields is the belief that he should not be
allowed to reveal his dual occupation to the public. Once the compe-
tency argument is analyzed, it seems logical to allow the practi-
tioner to convey his credentials without restriction. The dual practi-
tioner should not have to choose publication of one profession to the
exclusion of the other; therefore, it should be permissible to simulta-
neously convey that he is both a CPA and an attorney.
57. See, e.g., Loeb & Leete, The Dual Practitioner: C.P.A., Lawyer, or Both?, 137 J.




It is sometimes contended that dual practice should be allowed
because the services of both a lawyer and a CPA may be needed by
the small businessman who can only afford to employ one person.51
The argument has greater appeal in small communities where two
practitioners, one in each field, cannot find enough business to jus-
tify maintaining an office. 9
The "economy" argument is not the most forceful one because
of the difficulty in quantifying some of the underlying premises. For
example, it has been stated that the dual practitioner could render
services for less money than the combined fees of a separate attor-
ney and an accountant, but it has never, to this writer's knowledge,
been empirically established. Nevertheless, it seems that the eco-
nomic benefit that might be derived from the employment of a dual
practitioner is made difficult to obtain because a potential client
might not be able to identify a person who is both a CPA and an
attorney. The restrictions on the practitioner's ability to hold him-
self out to the public as a CPA/attorney impedes the potential
client's discovery of his qualifications.
C. Degree of Solicitation Involved
This issue is phrased in terms of the "degree" of solicitation
involved because all professional persons, including lawyers and
accountants, solicit to some extent. Whether solicitation is accom-
plished by joining the local Rotary Club or displaying one's name
in an office building directory, each attorney and accountant makes
use of some type of solicitation.
The pertinent question is whether the solicitation being pro-
scribed by refusing to allow a dual practitioner to hold himself out
as such amounts to a solicitation of a greater degree than many
other activities which are allowed. For example, letterheads may
indicate that a firm has offices in different cities, states, and coun-
tries. This information may encourage additional legal business be-
cause it indicates a capacity to serve the client in other geographic
locations.10 Similarly, announcements placed in various law directo-
ries, such as Martindale-Hub bell, are allowed to include self-serving
information that is considerably in excess of that which is asserted
58. Levy & Sprague, Accounting and Law: Is Dual Practice in the Public Interest?, 52
A.B.A.J. 1110, 1114 (1966).
59. Id.
60. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 2-102(A) (as amended Aug. 1976).
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as proper for the dual practitioner.
Another means by which lawyers and accountants indirectly
solicit business is through the retention of the names of deceased
former partners. This practice allegedly serves a legitimate need of
the public to be able to identify firms on some sort of consistent
basis.
None of these means of solicitation is being mentioned in a
derogatory manner. On the contrary, each example mentioned
serves the significant function of informing the public. No lesser
function would be served by allowing a dual practitioner to repre-
sent himself as such on his letterhead and office door or in a profes-
sional notice.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the accounting profession and the legal profes-
sion have discouraged individuals from engaging in the dual prac-
tice of accounting and law. Each has done so by restricting the right
of a dual practitioner to inform the public of the nature of his prac-
tice. The legal profession's prohibition comes through a provision in
its Code of Professional Responsibility while the accounting profes-
sion's prohibition comes through a ruling by an arm of its profes-
sional governing body.
A state has a significant regulatory power over the professions
within its boundaries. The state's power to regulate, however, must
be tempered by the dual practitioner's first amendment right to
communicate the nature of his practice to the public. Furthermore,
the public has a right protected by the first amendment to receive
the dual practitioner's communication. The key to this issue is
whether there is a compelling state interest in prohibiting such com-
munication between the dual practitioner and the public which is
superior to their respective rights to communicate and receive such
information. In order to establish a compelling interest the state
must show that significant evils result from permitting a law-
yer/CPA to inform the public of his dual practice. Unless this justifi-
cation is present, the state's interest in regulating professions is
outweighed by the practitioner's and the public's first amendment
rights.
In evaluating the state's interest in restricting the simultaneous
practice of accounting and law, there are several policy considera-




dual practitioner may not be able to perform all of the legal services
and all of the accounting services that a client may need. In an
analysis of this objection to dual practice it was pointed out that few
lawyers or accountants practice in all areas of their respective pro-
fessions. By allowing dual practice, both professions tacitly ac-
knowledge the lawyer/CPA's special skills and permit him to per-
form dual services. The restrictions are directed solely toward the
communication of this joint practice to the public. When the state
permits simultaneous practice of law and accounting, it is difficult
to find a valid state interest which justifies the restrictions on the
communication of such practice to the public.
Recent United States Supreme Court opinions place great im-
portance on the free flow of commercial speech and the public's
right to be informed of the nature of services available to them. Any
prohibition which restricts this kind of speech without valid and
significant reasons is likely to be an unconstitutional exercise of a
state's regulatory power. It is submitted that the impediments
which presently confront one who wishes simultaneously to practice
accounting and law should be removed.
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